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PHI 105 (1/19/09)An act is legal, if and only if, it’s permittedby the law.
This is not what determines if an act is morally right orwrong.
Ex.) Adultery, lying, historical example: Slavery.Acts that aremorally permissible but illegal. Examples?
Speeding late at night, little traffic no cameras. Smokingcannabis, which you grew yourself, in
the privacy of your own home.
Marrying someone of a different race in South Carolina prior to1998.
Moral claims are distinct from prudential claims.
Morality is essentially tied to the welfare of others, whereasprudence is not.
Imprudent: Not wise. Lack of caution I practical affairs.
Prudent: careful and sensible; marked by sound judgment.
Sometimes its morally impermissible to do what’s in yourlong-term best interest.
Examples:Get refunded money for college, send all to Haiti.
**Moral claims are distinct from claims about etiquette.
I expect Doug not to pick his nose during class, but it’s notmorally wrong.
Etiquette: “Delineates expectations for social behavioraccording to contemporary conventional
norms within a society, social class, or group.” (Wiki)
Examples of some norms of etiquette?
Morality, by contrast, delineates those actions for which we canrightly be held blameworthy
or praiseworthy.
Agents are necessarily blameworthy for freely andknowledgeably violating the requirements
of morality, but agents are not necessarily blameworthy forfreely and knowledgeablyviolating the requirements ofetiquette.
Whether a person is blame worthy only depends on if we believewhat they did was wrong.
What we have then is a disagreement of if what the person doneis actually wrong or not.
Normative Ethics (and its three branches)
A theory of the Right: What makes an act right//wrong?
A theory of the right takes the following firm:
An act is morally permissible (or impermissible or obligatory orsupererogatory (actions
that go beyond the call of duty)) if and only if, andbecause…
Example: An act is morally impermissible if and only if, andbecause, it is forbidden by
God.
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Normative Ethics (Cont.)
A Theory of the Good: What features of tings, events, or statesof affairs make them good or
bad?
A Theory of Virtue: What character traits make a person virtuousor vicious?
Meta-Ethics:
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Moral Language
Moral Metaphysics
Are their facts about what’s right or wrong?
Moral Epistemology
Study of knowledge. How do we know what the facts are.MoralPsychology
What’s the relationship between making a moral judgment andbeing able to act
accordingly?
Applied Ethics:
Is this or that particular type of action (e.g., abortion,capital punishment, affirmative action, etc.)
right or wrong?
Categories of Deontic Evaluation:
Morally Obligatory – that which is required, that which it wouldbe wrong to refrain from doing.
Morally right/permissible –which is not prohibited.
Morally optional –that which is neither required norprohibited.
Supererogatory –that which is above and beyond whatis morally required; that which is
both morally optional and morally better than some otherpermissible alternative.
Ex.) Bring a sick friend soup. Buy from store but you spend allday making soup.
Merely permissible:that which is morally optional but notsupererogatory.
Divine Command Theory: What god says makes things right orwrong.
The Aims of Moral Theory:
Practical Aim: The main practical aim of moral theory is todiscover a decision procedure that
can be used as a guide in our moral deliberations about what todo.
Theoretical Aim:The main theoretical aim of moral theoryis to discover what underlying
features of actions make them right and wrong and then, on thatbasis, to formulate a criterion
of moral rightness that states the most general conditions underwhich actions are right or
wrong.
Moral Theorizing: The Method of Narrow Reflection Equilibriumyou want to just keep going
straight on one moral path. You want a theory that is consistantwith your morals. - (An equilibrium
in which you don’t want to change your intuition or moral)
Start with some provisional moral judgments.
Formulate some provisional moral theory (or general principle)that accounts for these
provisional moral judgments.
Test this provisional moral theory (or general principle) to seewhether its implications conflict
with any of your other moral judgments. When conflicts arise, itis an open question as to
whether it is the theory or the judgments that need to berevised. Decide which to revise on the
basis of which seems more intuitively plausible afterreflection. Do this until no further revisions
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are necessary.
An illustration via a set of cases:
Does it matter is you chose to be in the situations or not? Orif you were forced to choose.
The Boat Rescue (Save the 1 person or the 5)
The Transplant (Kill your patient (non-consented) to save 5people who need the
patients organs)What’s the moral judgment that explains why youdon’t save five people in
the transplant?
Right of self ownership?
(1)It is permissible to let someone die to save five, butnot
permissible to kill one to save five.
The Runaway Trolley
Train can run through 5 people, unless you flip a switch whichthen makes the
train run only over one person.
If you choose to kill the one then (1)is flawed.
You still kill one person through the action of killing that oneperson.Doctrine of allowing?
~Doing harm is wrong but allowing harm is ok?~
Why we shouldn’t stop after having only reached a narrowreflective equilibrium.
The method of narrow reflective equilibrium is too conservative.It helps to us to render our
moral beliefs consistent, but we should not be satisfied withsimply rendering our own beliefs
consistent.
To enrich our reflection, we must reflect on alternativetheories, alternative judgments,
counterarguments to our theory, counterarguments to ourjudgments, the source of moral
judgments and the reliability of that source, ourbackground assumptions, and our competencyto judge.
The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium
The method tells us to do three things (DePaul):
Reflect on the interconnections among our beliefs.
Leave nothing out of our reflections. Reflect not only on ourown initial beliefs and their
interconnections, but also on ourselves and our competency tojudge, and reflect on alternative
beliefs, theories, and arguments.
Settle any conflicts that emerge, deciding what to believe onthe basis of what seems to be the
most intuitively plausible upon reflection.
Is there any rational alternative to this?
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DCT: An act is obligatory if and only it, and because, Godcommands it.
H1: God commands/forbids certain actions, because they areobligatory/wrong.
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H2: Actions are obligatory/wrong, because God commands/forbidsthem.
A tyrant is someone who exerts power over others without eitherthe proper moral authority of
sufficient moral justification for doing so.
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DTC (Cont.)On DCT, what is it to say that God is good?
Answer: It’s to say that God isit doesn’t make sense withthis view because it is to say
something that god commands us to bring about or preserve. But,surely, this can’t be
right. God’s not good. Not bad. Neutral.
This is the depriving God of His goodness objection.
Argument Against H1
P1: If H1 is true, then God can’t change the fact that X iswrong (or right).
P2: If God can’t change the fact that X is wrong (or right),then God isn’t omnipotent.
P3: God is omnipotent.C: Therefore, H1 is false.
What does it mean to say that God is omnipotent?
Can God create a boulder that even He cannot lift?
He can do anything that is logically possible. Anything thatdoes not create a
contradiction.
The Problem of Evil
The fact that X is wrong (or right) is either a necessary truthor a contingent truth. If it’s a
necessary truth, we should reject P2. And if it’s a contingenttruth, we should reject P1. So,
either way, then, the argument is unsound.
Necessary and contingent truths.Which of the following arenecessary? Which are contingent?
Barack Obama was the President of the United States in 2009.Contingent.
Either it is the case that Doug has a wife or it is not the casethat Doug has a wife. Necessary.
Masses attract one another. Contingent.
All bachelors are unmarried. Necessary.
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Another Argument Against H1
P1: If H1 is true, there’s a standard of right and wrong that’sindependent of God.
P2: If there’s a standard of right and wrong that’s independentof God, then God didn’t create
morality.
P3: If God didn’t create morality, then God isn’t the Creator ofall that is.
P4: God is the Creator of all that is.
C: Therefore, H1 is false.
Is this a good argument?
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Evaluating this argument
P1. H1claims only that morality is independent of God’scommands,not that morality is
independent of God. Two Examples: (1) Fiona and her dad. (2) Thelaws of nature and
God.
Of course, one might argue that, unlike the laws of nature, thelaws of morality are
necessarily what they are. What then?We should, then, reject P4.He is not the creator of all that is. Only contingent truths.
God is the Creator of that is contingent. After all,[Redacted].
Some Conclusions
The DCT/H2 seems to conflict with a number of common theistictenets: (1) God is good. (2) that
gos commands are not morally arbitrary, and (3) that God is nota tyrant.
The DCT/H2 also implausibly implies that anything goes withregard to what’s right and wrong.
H1, by contrast, conflicts with no theistic tenets. It’scompatible with both the idea that God is
the creator of all that contingently is and with the idea thatGod is omnipotent.
It seems, therefore, that even the theist should reject DCT andembrace H1.
1. Moral Relativism
What’s right and wrong for a person to do is ultimatelydetermined by the fundamental (i.e., basic) moral
norms of his or her culture.
More precisely, moral relativismsays: an act, A, performedby a subject, S, who is a member of a
culture, C, is morally permissible if and only if, andbecause,the fundamental moral norms of C permits
A to perform S.
2. Definitions
D1: C is a culture =df. C is a collection of people, oftenliving in close proximity to each other, sharing aset of socialnorms, conventions, and practices.
D2: X is a moral norm =df. X is a standard (that is, a rule or aprinciple) that renders some verdict
regarding the moral status of some act-type (e.g., “it is wrongto commit adultery”).
3. Continued
D3: X is a fundamental moral norm =df. X is a moral standardthat doesn’t derive from any more
fundamental moral standard.(e.g., the divine commandtheorist takes “it is wrong to act as God
forbids” to be a fundamental moral norm).
D4: X is a fundamental moral norm of C =df. the vast majority ofthe members of C believe that X is a
fundamental moral standard.
4. Moral Absolutism and Moral Non-Absolutism
Moral absolutismis the view that certain types of acts arewrong no matter how valuable their
consequences. Examples: Pacifists. Kant and the InquiringMurderer.
The distinction between an act-token and an act-type.
Moral non-absolutismis the view that there are no types ofacts that are wrong types of acts that are
wrong no matter how valuable their consequences.
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Note that there is a problem with defining the moral absolutistas one who believes that there are
absolute (exception-less) moral rules. Consideract-consequentialism: an act is morally permissible if and
only if, and because, there is no available alternative thatwould produce more good than it would.
5. The Context-Sensitivity ThesisTimmons defines the thesis asfollows:
“The rightness or wrongness of an action (performed in someparticular context) partly depends
on nonmoral facts that hold in the context—facts concerningagents and their circ*mstances” (p.
42).
This thesis is fairly uncontroversial, but it should not beconfused with moral relativism.
Someone can accept this thesis and deny moral relativism. Andsomeone can accept this thesis
while also accepting moral relativism.
6. Moral Objectivism
Moral Objectivism (a.k.a. the Universality Thesis): There areuniversal moral norms that arebinding on all persons irrespectiveof the culture/society to which they belong. On moral
objectivism, the truth of a moral claim/judgment does NOT dependon whether it
conforms to the norms, beliefs, attitudes, or conventions of anygroup or individual. It
depends, rather, on what the objective moral facts are.
7. Continued…
More precisely, moral objectivismsays: an act, A,performed by a subject, S, is morally
permissible if and only if, and because,the universalmoral norms that are binding on all
persons permit S to perform A.
Examples: Act-Consequentialism; Divine Command Theory.Can themoral objectivist accept moral non-absolutism?
8. A practice quiz (but first some preliminaries)
P and Q are compatible =df. it is logically possible for both Pand Q to be true.
P and Q are incompatible =df. it is logically impossible forboth P and Q to be true.
Are the following sets of claims compatible?
A1: John is married. A2: John is a bachelor.(Incompatible.)
B1: John is a professional philosopher. B2: John is a rock star.(Compatible.)
C1: John is not happy. C2: John is not unhappy.(Compatible.)
D1: John is not insane. D2: John is not sane. (Incompatible.)E1:John Kerry is tall. E2: George W. Bush is a Democrat.(Compatible.)
9. The Questions
For each of the numbered claims below, state (a) whether it’scompatible or incompatible with
moral relativism (MR) and (b) whether it’s compatible orincompatible with moral objectivism
(MO).
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(C1) Acts of cruelty, slavery, terrorism, and genocide are wrongwhether people or societies
condemn or condone them.
MR?
MR: Incompatible. Thus. MR has some seriously counterintuitiveimplications.
MO?
MO: Compatible.
10. Continued…
(C2) In the United States, certain fundamental moral norms(e.g., those with regard to how
women and minorities should be treated) have changed for thebetter.
MR?
MR: Incompatible. Note that, on MR there can be no moralprogress in the sense of society's
norms changing for the better. There can only be moral progressin the sense of peoples rate of
compliance with the moral norms increases.
11. Continued…MO?
MO: Compatible.On MO, there is an objectively correct setof moral norms. And, thus, there
can be moral progress when our society's moral norms change fromthose that are incorrect to
those that are correct.
12. Continued…
(C3) The people of different societies accept different moralnorms.
MR?
MR: Compatible.
MO?MO: Compatible. According to MO< there is one objectivelycorrect set of moral norms. But the
moral objectivist does not claim that all societies accept thesenorms or even that all societies
will accept the same norms.
13. Continued…
(C4) Whether lying is right or wrong depends on the value of theconsequences of doing so.
MR?
MR: Compatible.
MO?
MO: Compatible. The moral objectivist can be a moralnon-absolutist.
14. Continued…
(C5) Although it would be wrong for DWP to let his grandparentsfreeze to death just so that he
can use his disposable income to take a vacation rather than topay their heating bill, it wasn’t
wrong for the Eskimos to let their elders freeze to death asthey sometimes did prior to the 20th
century.
MR?
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MR: Compatible.
MO?
15. Continued…
MO: Compatible. The moral objectivist can accept C5 by assertingthat the following is a
universal moral norm: This principle yields different moralverdicts for DWP and the historicalEskimos given that theircirc*mstances are/were very different. But, of course, if DWPdid
ever find himself in relevantly similar circ*mstances, then themoral objectivist must admit that
DWP would be permitted to let his elders die.
16. Continued…
(C6) What it is right and wrong to do can depend on the customsof a given society.
MR?
MR: Compatible.
MO?
MO: Compatible. On MO, fundamental moral norms are universal,but the moral objectivist canaccept the context-sensitivity thesisand hold that derivative moral norms vary from one culture
to another.
17. Continued…
Suppose that the following is a universal, fundamental moralnorm: "Be polite to a gracious
host."Given this principle, what should a man do beforeentering a church? A synagogue? What
should someone do if invited into someone’s home in Japan? Themainland U.S.? Since what’s
right and wrong to do can depend on what’s considered polite,and since what’s considered
polite just depends on the customs of a given society, what itis right and wrong to do can
(indirectly) depend on the customs of a given society
18. Continued…
(C7) Whether or not women should go around bare-breasted andwhether or not men should
wear a suit and tie to work is just a matter of custom. There isno objective truth about such
matters.
MR?
MR: Compatible.
MO?
MO: Compatible.Arguable, norms of dress are not moralnorms, but rather norms of etiquette.
The moral objectivist is only committed to there being anobjective truth about morality, notetiquette.
19. Continued…
(C8) One’s own society isn’t in a privileged position withregard to knowing what’s right and
wrong for one to do.
MR?
MR: Incompatible. One's own society is in a privileged positionwith regard to knowing what's
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right and wrong for one to do, for, on MR, what's right andwrong for one to do just depends on
what the norms of one's society.
MO?
MO: Compatible.
20. Continued…(C9) People of all societies should be tolerant ofone another’s religious beliefs.
MR?
MR: Incompatible. Whether or not someone should be tolerant ofsomeone else's religios
beliefs is a moral question. And, on MR, such moral questionsare determined by the moral
norms of one's culture. Since, in some cultures...
21. Continued…
MO?
See AlsoPAPER 17 - STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT · Paper – 17 ... Adam, fresh from school was a newly recruited HR practitioner. ... As an HR practitioner, Adam should let Roy know - [PDF Document]Fostering Middle School Teachers’ Mathematical Knowledge for Teaching via Analysis of Tasks and Student WorkSouth Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low PriorityAddressing Law Enforcement Violence as a Public Health IssueMO: Compatible. Indeed, since C9 is stating a universal moralnorm, one most be an moral
objectivist to accept C9.
22. Why accept or reject moral relativism?
Next, we will look at various arguments for and against moralrelativism.
23. The Moral Diversity Thesis (MDT)
Many people accept MR on the basis of the following thesis.
The Moral Diversity Thesis: People in different societies acceptdifferent fundamental moral
norms (a.k.a. basic moral norms).
Note that the MDT is a claim about what people believe tobetrue, whereas MR is claim about
what istrue.Is MDT true?
24. The Argument for the Moral Diversity Thesis
People in different societies make different moral judgmentsregarding the same type of action.
If people in different societies make different moral judgmentsregarding the same type of action,
they must accept different fundamental moral norms.
Therefore, people in different societies accept differentfundamental moral norms. (The Moral
Diversity Thesis)
25. P2 is falseSome other possible explanations for moraldisagreement:
Different Non-moral beliefs(Ex. Apply “One ought not killsacred beings” to both Hindu and
Christian cultures.)
Different Customs(Ex. Apply “One ought to be polite to agracious host.” to different
cultural contexts.)
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26. Continued…
Different Environmental Conditions (Ex. Apply “Save peoplefrom death unless doing so
will very likely increase the number of deaths overall.” todifferent environmental
conditions.)
Although P2 of the Argument for the Moral Diversity Thesisis false, it doesn’t follow that the
moral diversity thesis is false. So, for the sake of argument, Iwill grant the proponent of moralrelativism that it is true. Thefollowing are two arguments based on the moral diversitythesis.
27. The Argument from Fundamental Moral Disagreement, v1 (a.k.a.The Anthropologist’s
Argument, v1)
People in different societies accept different fundamental moralnorms. (=MDT)
If people in different societies accept different fundamentalmoral norms, then MO is false.
Therefore, MO is false.
28. Evaluating the Argument
Is this a good argument?Well, as we saw, P1 is questionable.
In any case, P2 is false. The fact that people disagree about Xdoes not entail that there
is no objective fact about X.
Consider the shape of the Earth.
29. The Argument from Fundamental Moral Disagreement, v2
OBSERVATION: The quality and quantity of moral disagreementappears to differ significantly
from the quality and quantity of disagreement that we find withregard to objective matters of fact
(e.g., matters of science).
EXPLANATION: One possible explanation for the observation in P1is that there is no objectivemorality.
COMPARISON: No other explanation for the observation in P1provides at least as good an
explanation as the explanation given in P2.
Therefore, there is no objective morality.
30. The Main Thrust of the Argument
Some philosophers believe that what explains inter- andintra-societal moral disagreement is that
there are simply no moral facts, but only differing moralattitudes. According to these
philosophers, differences in moral belief are more readilyexplained by the hypothesis that they
reflect people’s differing attitudes than by the hypothesis thatthey reflect people’s variousdistortions, misperceptions, orignorance of an objective moral reality.
31. Continued…
Now we should note that there has been an awful lot of genuinedisagreement in the areas of
science and metaphysics, and from this, we do not conclude thatthere are no scientific facts
and no metaphysical facts. So these philosophers must claim thatmoral disagreement is
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somehow more substantial or more fundamental than the kind ofdisagreement we find in these
other areas where there is clearly some objective fact of thematter.
32. Is moral disagreement more fundamental or substantial?
We must keep the following in mind:
There may be less moral disagreement and more moral agreementthan you think.Disagreement about specific moral rules often issuesfrom disagreement concerning the
relevant non-moral facts. Consider, for example, the issues ofabortion and capital punishment.
And there is a fair amount of moral agreement. Forexample, there is wide agreement that
suffering is bad and ought to be prevented.
33. Continued…
There may be more disagreement in the sciences than you think.At bottom, science relies on
abductive reasoning. But there is nearly as much disagreementconcerning the principles of
abductive reasoning as there is concerning moral principles.
Non-religious moral inquiry is relatively young compared toscientific inquiry. If we look atscientific inquiry in its infancy,there was a tremendous amount of disagreement. Yet we would
have be wrong to conclude back then, that the best explanationfor these disagreements was
that there are no objective scientific facts.
34. Continued…
Consider that the breadth and depth of disagreement regardingother philosophical issues is no
greater than that regarding moral issues in particular.Philosophers disagree just as much about
metaphysical issues—such as, about whether God exists, aboutwhether free will is compatible
with determinism, and about whether the mind is identical to thebrain—as they do about moral
issues—such as, whether the ends justify the means. So we face adilemma: either this breadthand depth of disagreement warrantsdenying objectivity about any of these issues or it warrants
denying objectivity about none of these issues. But do we reallybelieve that there is no objective
fact as to whether, say, God exists?
35. Problems with Moral Relativism
Problems of Formulation
The Problem of Intercultural Evaluation - cant evaluate othercultures based on our
fundamentally moral norms.
The Problem of Intracultural Evaluation -
The Moral Reformer Problem -There is no objective truthabout what's morally right orwrong so moral laws cant be reformedfor the better. (Or worse)
The Problem of Conflicts with Our Considered Moral Judgments
36. Moral Relativism and Tolerance
Suppose that we grant that moral relativism is true. Would itfollow that people of all societies
should be tolerant of each other’s differing norms andpractices? After all, it’s not as if one’s
society’s norms and practices would be any better than anothersociety’s norms and practices,
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would it?
37. Evaluating DCT
Consistency
Determinacy
Intuitive AppealInternal Support
Explanatory Power
External Support
38. Conclusions
We’ve found no good argument in support of moral relativism.
We’ve found that moral relativism, but not moral objectivism, iswildly at odds with our
commonsense intuitions.
Douglas Portmore
LECTURE 4:
Values in a Scientific World
Last Updated: 1/28/10
1. The Challenge for Moral Objectivism
“Suppose, with [moral] objectivism, that moral judgments aretrue, and true quite independently
of what we happen to think of them. They are true, when theyare, because they accurately
report objective moral facts. But the nature of such facts canappear very mysterious. We readily
grant that geologists and chemists, physicists and astronomersdeal in objective truth, because
we believe that their findings are targeted on a natural worldwhose features exist independently
of whether anyone recognizes them. Botanical facts are factsabout plants; geological facts are
facts about rocks….”
2. The Challenge for Moral Objectivism (continued…)
“…In botany and geology, evidence is supplied bythree-dimensional, tangible, physical stuff. We
can taste it, smell it, and see it. We can’t taste wrongness orhear rightness. Moral facts, if they
were to exist, would have to be quite odd sorts of things,certainly nothing at all like the kinds of
phenomena studied by the recognized sciences” (91).
3. Are moral facts scientifically confirmable (i.e.,scientifically verifiable)?
Can we see, touch, taste, hear, or smell the wrongness of anact?
Some reject the idea that there are moral facts given that moralfacts are not scientifically
confirmable.
4. The Confirmation Test
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According to the confirmation test, a claim (or putativefact) is true if and only if it is
scientifically confirmable (i.e., empirically verifiable).
Note that only true claims can be confirmed. However, some trueclaims are not
scientifically confirmable. For instance, we cannotscientifically confirm either that parallel
lines do not intersect or that the sum of the angles of anytriangle equals 180 degrees.
The confirmation test cannot be true. If it were true, it wouldrefute itself, for it states a claimthat is not itselfscientifically confirmable. Thus, it's a self-refuting claim.
5. The Confirmation Test (continued…)
In any case, even scientific claims (such as the claim that theEarth is not flat) cannot be
confirmed via empirical observation alone.
The example of a boat disappearing over the horizon.
Observations are theory-laden. And, thus, at the end of the day,science must rely on abductive
reasoning (reasoning from best explanation). And the principlesof abductive reasoning are not
themselves scientifically confirmable. So even science rests onclaims that are not themselves
scientifically confirmable.
6. But are moral facts needed to explain anything?
People’s moral beliefs? People’s moral attitudes? People’s moral(or immoral) behavior?
What about other moral facts? Might we need some moral facts toexplain other moral facts?
Perhaps, but this would beg the question.
It seems, then, that we do not need to postulate moral facts toexplain any non-moral fact. And
although we might need moral facts to explain other moral facts,we can’t just assume that there
are any moral facts that need explaining, for doing so wouldamount to begging the question.
7. Occam’s RazorSome might employ Occam’s razor against the ideathat there are moral facts.
Occam’s razor(a.k.a. the principle of parsimony):Other things being equal, one hypothesis is
better than another if it is simpler than the other, and onehypothesis is simpler than another if
and only if it requires us to postulate the existence of fewerunknown facts, entities,
properties, or processes-- that is, fewer facts, entities,properties, and processes
beyond those that we already know about it.
8. Occam’s Razor (continued…)
The simplest explanation is not necessarily the one that is theleast complex or the easiest
to understand.Examples: Explaining (1) biological organisms, (2)crop circles, (3) reports of alien abduction, (4)
noises in the walls when the hot water is turned on, etc.
Occam’s razor doesn’t say that it is more likely that there arenas opposed to n+1 facts, entities,
properties, or processes in the universe. It does not say, forinstance, that, in absence any
evidence either way, it is more likely that silicon-basedlife-forms don’t exist than it is that
silicon-based life-forms do exist, other things being equal.Rather, it says only that, in the
absence of any evidence for the existence of silicon-basedlife-forms, an explanation that doesn’t
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postulate their existence is superior to one that does, otherthings being equal.
9. Occam’s Razor (continued…)
Why is the one superior to the other?
Answer: Because it has fewer commitments that might turnout to be false.
Of course, this means that an explanation that postulatesnothing with respect to whethersilicon-based life-forms exist is,other things being equal, superior to an explanation that
postulates that silicon-based life-forms don’t exist.
Thus, an explanation that postulates some unknown negativeexistential claim is just as
worrisome as an explanation that postulates some unknownpositive existential claim.
So Occam’s razor does not support the contention that there areno facts or properties beyond
those that are needed to explain our empirical observations.Indeed, such a contention is quite
controversial.
10. The Argument from Explanatory Impotence
If X (some fact, entity, property, or process) exists or isreal, then its reality/existence must benecessary to explain someof our empirical observations.
The reality/existence of moral facts and properties isn’t neededto explain any of our empirical
observations.
Therefore, moral facts and properties don’t exist and are notreal.
11. Why we should reject Premise 1of the explanatoryimpotence argument
Why accept Premise 1?
Premise 1 has counter-intuitive implications. Premise 1 impliesthat such things as
“atmospheres, rock strata, newts, and dandelions” don’t exist orare unreal, for none of these are
needed to explain our empirical observations. After all, itseems that we need only postulate theexistence of sub-atomicparticles to explain our empirical observations.
But even if you don’t have a problem with such a sparseontology, there is another reason to
reject premise 1. If we accept Premise 1, then we must deny thereality of all normative facts
and properties, including the normative fact that we ought toinfer the Conclusion (i.e., 3) from
Premises 1 and 2.
12. Why all normative facts seem to be in the same boat
A normative fact is a fact about whether S ought or hasreason to φ, where S stands for some
rational subject and φ stands for some reason-sensitive attitudesuch as a desire, a belief, or an
intention. These facts includes prudential and epistemicfacts.No normative fact is scientifically confirmable. Nor arenormative facts needed to explain any of
our empirical observations.
So if we reject moral facts on such grounds, then we must rejectall normative facts, including all
prudential facts and all epistemic facts. And that’s a toughpill to swallow.
13. Explanation versus Prescription
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To insist that, for moral facts and properties to exist, theymust be able to explain some of our
empirical observations is just to miss the point and purpose ofmoral thinking. The “point of
thinking about what is right or wrong, good or bad, just orunjust, is not, it seems, to figure out
what happened or why, but to figure out what should happen andwhy” (Sayre-McCord). Thus the
point is prescription, not explanation—that is, to prescribewhat ought to be the case as opposed
to explain what is the case.
14. Continued…
So, yes, it’s true that moral facts and properties are notneeded to explain anything, but that
doesn’t mean that we should deny that there are such facts andproperties, for explanation is not
all that there is. There is also prescription (or normativity).And, for there to be prescription, there
must be normative facts and properties.
15. Are moral facts compatible with a scientific worldview?
The answer depends on whether the scientific worldview is takento be (a) the view that there
are no other facts or properties besides those that are studiedby empirical sciences or(b) the view that all events in space andtime are best given scientific explanations.
If (a), the answer to the above question is no.
If (b), the answer to the above question is yes.
Which is more plausible: (a) or (b)?
16. Continued…
It may seem that if normative claims are non-scientific claims,then they must conflict with the
claims of science. This is not so. Of course, somenon-scientific claims do conflict with the
claims of science, viz., those that “involve claims about eventsoccurring in space and time, and
about what things cause or are caused by them” (Scanlon). Butunlike various causal claimsinvolving the paranormal and thesupernatural (ESP, ghostly hauntings, acts of God, therapeutic
touch, demonic possessions, etc.), which are all veryimplausible given our ordinary empirical
standards for assessing such causal claims, normative claimsmake no claims about events in
space and time.
17. Continued…
It may be objected that our beliefs about normative facts musthave motivational efficacy if
they’re to retain their practical relevance. And thus ournormative beliefs must be able to cause
us to have the attitudes that they support our having, and this,some might argue, would be just
as mysterious as supernatural causal powers, such as therapeutictouch. But there is nothingmysterious here, for it is not thenormative fact that must have motivational/causal efficacy.
Rather, it is the normative belief(a natural,psychological state) that must have
motivational/causal efficacy. So it is the natural state ofbelieving some normative fact, not the
normative fact itself, that has the power to cause the formationof the attitude that is called for by
the normative fact.
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18. Conclusions
We’ve seen that that the fact that moral facts are notscientifically confirmable does not support
the contention that there are no moral facts.
We’ve seen that Occam’s razor does not support the contentionthat there are no moral facts.
And we’ve seen that the fact that moral facts are notneeded to explain any of our empirical
observations does not support the contention that there are nomoral facts.Furthermore, we’ve seen that moral facts seem to be inthe same boat as other normative facts.
If we reject moral facts on the grounds that they’re notempirically verifiable, then we would have
to also reject epistemic facts, for they are no more empiricallyverifiable than moral facts are.
And if we reject epistemic facts, then we must deny thatthere is any reason to reject the view
that there are moral facts.
Possible Exam Questions concerning Lecture 4
(a) What does the confirmation test say? (b) Is the confirmationtest true? Explain.
(a) Explain Occam’s razor. (b) Give an example where, accordingto Occam’s razor, one
explanation is superior to another. (c) Is the simplestexplanation the one that is the easiest tounderstand? Explain. (d)Does Occam’s razor support the contention that there are nomoral
facts or properties? Explain.
Are moral facts needed to explain anything? Explain.
Critically assess the following argument:
If X (some fact, entity, property, or process) exists or isreal, then its reality/existence must be
necessary to explain some of our empirical observations.
The reality/existence of moral facts and properties isn’t neededto explain any of our empirical
observations.
Therefore, moral facts and properties don’t exist and are notreal.
What is point of thinking about what is right or wrong, good orbad, just or unjust?Are moral facts compatible with ascientific worldview? Explain.
PHI 105
LECTURE 5:
Utilitarianism
Last Updated: 3/2/10
1. Act-Utilitarianism Characterized
The view is consequentialist:Actions are to be judgedright or wrong solely in virtue of the
goodness or badness of their consequences.The view iswelfarist:In assessing the goodness (or badness) of an act’sconsequences,
the only thing that matters is welfare (i.e., that which makessomeone’s life go well for
him or her). Welfare is the only thing good for its ownsake.
The view is universalist, impartialist,andaggregative:The right act is the one the
produces the greatest net sum of welfare while weighingimpartially increases and
diminutions in the welfare of all those affected by the act.
The view endorses a maximizing conception of rightaction:An act is permissible if and
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only if there is no available alternative that would producemore utility than it would.
2. Hedonistic Act-Utilitarianism
Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism:An act is morallypermissible if and only if, and because, it
maximizes hedonic utility.
Hedonic Utility:The hedonic utility of an act equals thetotal amount of hedons itproduces minus the total amount of dolorsit produces, where a hedonis the standard
unit of measurement of pleasureand a doloristhe standard unit of measurement of
pain.
An act maximizes hedonic utilityif and only ifthere is no alternative act available to
the agent that would produce more hedonic utility than it would.Note, then, that
more than one act can maximize hedonic utility.
3. An Example of the HAU Calculus
An Example of the HAU Calculus: Suppose that the availablealternatives are a1, a2, a3,
and a4. And suppose that the people who would be affected arep1, p2, p3, and p4…
4. An Example of the HAU Calculus (continued…)
p1 p2 p3 p4 HU
a1 10 6 14 -10 =20
a2 100 -90 8 0 =18
a3 5 5 5 5 =20
a4 -10 -10 -10 35 =5
5. The Motivation for HAU
The thought is that HAU is just a natural extension of thefamiliar balancing and
maximizing conception of rationality from diachronicintrapersonal contexts to
diachronic interpersonal (moral) contexts.
The diachronic intrapersonal context: The temporal location of abenefit or harm within a
life does not, as such, have any rational significance. Weshould, therefore, be temporally
neutral with respect to whenharms and benefits occur inour lives. And we should be
willing to make sacrifices now for the sake of future benefitsthat will more than offsetthese sacrifices.
6. Continued…
The diachronic interpersonal (moral) context: From the moralpoint of view, no one
person’s welfare is any more or less important that another’s.So, the location of a benefit
or harm within a population of persons has no moralsignificance. And thus, as we move
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from the point of view of individual rationality to the point ofview of morality, we should not
only be temporally neutral with respect to whenharms andbenefits occur, but also be
person-neutral (or impartial) with respect to whor*ceivessome harm or benefit.
Furthermore, we should again be willing to make trade offs (tobalance) for the sake of
maximizing welfare over time and across individuals.
7. Getting a feel for the theory: A Practice Quiz
Answer the following questions according to whathedonistic act utilitarianism (HAU)
entails. Answer either “Necessarily True” or “Not NecessarilyTrue.”
(Q1) An act is morally impermissible if it causes someone a lotof pain and no pleasure.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
Answer:[Redacted].
8. Continued…
Suppose that there are exactly three act alternatives availableto the agent: a1-a3. Further
suppose that these acts will have effects on only three persons:p1-p3. Now let ‘HU(p1)’stand for ‘p1’s hedonic utility’, and let‘HU’ stand for ‘the total aggregate utility’. Suppose,
then, that the scenario is this:
act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU(p3) HU moral status
a1 +10 −100 +130 +40 permissible
a2 +5 +5 +5 +15 impermissible
a3 +15 +25 0 +40 permissible
9. Continued…
Lesson: On HAU, [Redacted]. This means that one may permissiblyimpose great
sacrifices on some for the sake of greater gains in theaggregate.
(Q2) An act is morally impermissible if it produces, in theaggregate, more pain than
pleasure. In other words, an act is morally impermissible if ithas negative hedonic utility.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
10. Continued…
Answer:[Redacted]. Consider, for instance, thefollowing scenario:act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU(p3) HU moral status
a1 +10 −100 +30 −60 impermissible
a2 +5 −5 −5 −5 impermissible
a3 +15 +25 −41 −1 permissible
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11. Continued…
Lesson:According to HAU, whether or not an act ispermissible can only be determined
by [Redacted].
(Q3) If an act produces pleasure for many and pain for no one,then it is morally
permissible. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
12. Continued…
Answer:[Redacted]. On HAU, it’s not alwayssufficient to produce pleasure for many
and pain for no one; one must [Redacted]. Consider the followingscenario:
act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU(p3) HU moral status
a1 +10 −100 +130 +40 impermissible
a2 +100 +100 +100 +300 impermissible
a3 +100 +101 +100 +301 permissible
13. Continued…
Lesson:Because HAU requires that we always maximizehedonic utility, it will be a
[Redacted]. It will require each of us to perform an altruisticself-sacrificing act whenever
the self-sacrifice that we thereby make will be more than offsetby altruistic benefits we
thereby bestow on others.
(Q4) It is morally impermissible to listen to Metallicaonthe car’s CD player if the othertwo people in the car would getmore pleasure from listening to The Beatles. Assume
that listening to Metallicaand listening to TheBeatlesare the only two available options.
Assume that you and the other two people in the car arethe only ones who will be
affected by this choice. Necessarily true or not necessarilytrue?
14. Continued…
Answer:[Redacted]. If HAU was a democracy, it wouldbe “[Redacted]”; it would not be
“[Redacted].” Let a1 = listen to Metallica, and let a2 = listento The Beatles. Now
suppose that the scenario is this:
act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU(p3) HU moral status
a1 +10 +10 +80 +100 permissible
a2 +15 +15 +15 +45 impermissible
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15. Continued…
Lesson:Some people will [Redacted]simply becausethey stand to gain or lose more
than others do. There might even be utility monsters: people whoget so much pleasure
from getting what they want that the rest of us would all bemorally required to do
whatever we can to fulfill their every desire.
(Q5) In an effort to help his patient, Dr. Smith injects Joneswith a shot of penicillin afterdutifully asking him whether he’sallergic to penicillin and hearing Jones say that he isn’t.
Nevertheless, it turns out, unbeknownst to Jones even, thatJones is severely allergic to
penicillin, and, consequently, he dies as a result of theinjection. Assuming that there
would have been more hedonic utility had Dr. Smith not injectedJones with the shot of
penicillin, it follows that what Dr. Smith did was wrong.Necessarily true or not
necessarily true?
16. Continued…
Answer:[Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted]areirrelevant in assessing whether his or her
act is permissible or not; it’s only the consequences of theaction and of their alternativesthat matter.
Lesson:HAU says nothing about [Redacted]. Thus it does notrequire that we are
always motivated to act out of a concern to maximize hedonicutility. Sometimes we will
act out of a partial concern for ourselves or for our lovedones, but what’s important is
that our acts accord with HAU, not that they are motivated by adesire to act in
accordance with HAU.
17. Continued…
(Q6) Anyone who acts wrongly as Dr. Smith did above is a morallybad person,
deserving of both blame and punishment. Necessarily true or notnecessarily true?
Answer:[Redacted]. As it stands, HAU evaluates[Redacted]. So it entails nothingabout whether such a person ismorally bad or deserving of blame.
18. Continued…
Caveat:Even if HAU commits us to the view that an agent’smotives and intentions are
irrelevant when assessing the moral value of her actions, itdoesn’t commit us to the view
that an agent’s motives and intentions are irrelevant whenassessing the moral goodness
of her character.
(Q7) It is morally permissible to torture an innocent baby incertain circ*mstances.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
Answer:[Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted], and thusvirtually any type of act can, inprinciple, be justified and,indeed, will be justified if it maximizes hedonic utility.
19. Continued…
To illustrate, let a1 = torture the innocent baby, a2 = refrainfrom torturing the innocent
baby, p1 = the would-be torturer, and p2 = the would-be torturevictim. Now consider the
following scenario:
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act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU moral status
a1 +100 −99 +1 permissible
a2 0 0 0 impermissible
20. Continued…
Lessons:First, on HAU, everyone’s welfare counts, andcounts equally, regardless of
desert. Second, on HAU, it is permissible to maim, murder, andeven massacre innocent
people provided that doing so will maximize hedonic utility. OnHAU, most any type of act
is, in principle, justifiable.
(Q8) The effects that our actions will have on people’s welfaremillions of years from now
are just as important as their immediate effects. Necessarilytrue or not necessarily true?
21. Continued…
Answer:[Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted]. Let a1 = stayafter class and talk to John, a2= go home immediately after class,stopping to talk to no one, pc = the six billion or so
people that currently exist, and pf = the ten billion or sopeople that will exist three
generations from now. And let’s suppose that if I stay afterclass and talk to John, John
will after we’re finished go to the local coffee shop and meet awoman standing behind
him in line, a woman whom he falls in love with and has a childwith. Assume that this
child’s grandchild ends up being an evil fascist dictator whocauses untold suffering.
Lastly, assume that had I not stayed after class to talk withJohn, he would have left for
the coffee shop much earlier, and, consequently, this evilfascist dictator would have
never existed.
22. Continued…
Suppose, then, that the scenario is this:
act HU(pc) HU(pf) HU moral status
a1 +1 −100 tr. −999,999,999,99
9
impermissible
a2 0 0 0 permissible
23. Continued…Lesson:Given that there are, at any givenmoment, an infinite number of available act
alternatives, and given that one would need to know what effectseach of these will have
from now until the end of time to know what their hedonicutilities are, one can never
know with any degree of certainty what one morally ought to doon HAU. Some have,
therefore, objected to HAU on the grounds that it is tooimpractical to be action guiding.
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24. Continued…
(Q9) While waiting at a crosswalk, Mr. Smith sees a strangerabout step off the curb into
the path on an oncoming, speeding bus. Without thinking, Mr.Smith reaches out, grabs
the stranger, and pulls him back onto the curb, saving his life.Mr. Smith does this without
even thinking about what the hedonic utility of this act or anyof its alternatives might be.
What Mr. Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or notnecessarily true?Answer:[Redacted]. On HAU, whatmatters is not [Redacted], but whether the way you
in fact acted maximized hedonic utility.
25. Continued…
To illustrate, let a1 = your instinctually grabbing the strangerand pulling him back to
safety, a2 = your calculating the likely hedonic utility of eachof the various act alternatives
available to you while the stranger is struck and killed by thebus, p1 = you, and p2 = the
stranger. Suppose, then, that the scenario is this:
act HU(p1) HU(p2) HU moral status
a1 +20 0 +20 permissible
a2 −20 −999,980 −1 mil. impermissible
26. Continued…
Lesson:HAU is a [Redacted]. To understand the difference,consider the difference
between the criterion for being HIV infected (or brain dead),and the procedure that we
might use to determine whether someone is HIV infected (or braindead). And note that
HAU is no more impractical than the view that the most prudentact is the one that willmaximize one’s utility over time. And noone would suggest that we ought to reject the
investment principle “Buy low, and sell high” just because it isoften times practically
impossible to know whether the price of a stock is headed up ordown.
27. Continued…
(Q10) If you promised a kid ten bucks to wash your car and hedid as promised (he
washed your car and did a nice job), you should give him the tenbucks. Necessarily true
or not necessarily true?
Answer:[Redacted]. Whether or not you should givethe kid the ten bucks depends, not
on whether [Redacted], but rather on whether[Redacted].Lesson:HAU is entirely [Redacted]. What happenedin the past is, on HAU, irrelevant in
determining what one morally ought to do. The past isirrelevant, because nothing you do
now can affect the hedonic utility of any past event.
28. Continued…
(Q11) Mr. Smith has an extra $500 this month after paying allhis bills. He uses that $500
to buy his son a set of encyclopedias to help with his son’sschoolwork. But had Smith
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instead used that $500 to buy some stranger’s kid a set ofencyclopedias that would have
produced slightly more hedonic utility. What Mr. Smith did waswrong. Necessarily true or
not necessarily true?
Answer:[Redacted]. On HAU, [Redacted]pleasuresand pains count equally,
regardless of one’s relationship to those affected. The hedonicutility of one’s friends and
family members are no more (or less) important, on HAU, thanthat of completestrangers.
Lesson:On HAU, there are no special obligations, andspecial relationships have no
intrinsic importance.
29. Continued…
(Q12) In deciding what to eat for breakfast this morning, Mr.Johnson is morally required
to make the choice that produces the greatest hedonic utility.Assume that, according to
HAU, Mr. Johnson ought to eat something for breakfast thismorning, and that what
choice he makes will affect only himself. Necessarily true ornot necessarily true?
Answer:[Redacted].Lesson:According to HAU,morality is [Redacted]. Every practical decision and choice
is a moral one, even those that are quite trivial and have noramifications for anyone but
the agent. There is no moral asymmetry between the self andothers. You have just as
much moral reason to promote your own hedonic utility as topromote anyone else’s.
30. Continued…
(Q13) The King of Siam must adopt either policy X or policy Y.This decision will affect
only those people belonging to one of the following twopopulations: population A and
population B. Population A consists in a hundred poor personswith 10 hedons each.
Population B consists in a hundred affluent persons with 100hedons each. The King ofSiam adopts policy X, which has no effecton the people in population A, but raises the
number of hedons for each person in population B by 90 hedons.Had the King of Siam
adopted policy Y instead, this would have had no effect on thepeople in population B, but
would have raised the number of hedons for each person inpopulation A by 90 hedons.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
31. Continued…
Policy X, therefore, worsens the already existing inequalitythat exists between the two
populations, whereas policy Y would make things equal by raisingthe level of welfare of
the worse off. Given that the people in population A are equallydeserving of 100 hedons
as the people in population B are, it was wrong of the King ofSiam to have adopted policy
X.
32. Continued…
Answer:[Redacted]. Let a1 = adopt policy X, a2 =adopt policy Y, pA = population A, and
pB = population B. The scenario is as follows:
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act HU(pa) HU(pb) HU moral status
a1 +10,000 +10,000 +20,000 permissible
a2 +1000 +19,000 +20,000 permissible
33. Continued…
Lesson:On HAU, [Redacted]. HAU is not sensitive toconcerns about desert or
distributive justice.
(Q14) On HAU, there are no supererogatory acts (i.e., acts thatgo above and beyond
what duty requires). Necessarily true or not necessarilytrue?
Answer:[Redacted]. Whether it is true or not dependson what counts as a
supererogatory act. Some define supererogatory acts as thosethat do more for the sake
of others than duty requires. Others define supererogatory actssuch that S’s performing
xis supererogatory only if there exists someavailable alternative, y, such that (a) S ismorally permittedboth to performxand to perform y, and (b) Shas more moral reason
to performxthan to perform y.
34. Continued…
If the former definition is correct, then HAU can accommodatesupererogatory acts. But if
the latter is the correct definition, then HAU cannotaccommodate supererogatory acts.
Let HU(s) = the hedonic utility that accrues to oneself andHU(o) = the hedonic utility that
accrues to others.
act HU(s) HU(o) HU moral status
a1 +10 +5 +15 permissible
a2 +5 +10 +15 perm. or super.(?)
a3 +10 0 +10 impermissible
35. Continued…
Lesson:Either HAU leaves no room for supererogatory actsor there is no more moral
reason to perform a supererogatory act than there is to performsome permissible but
non-supererogatory alternative.(Q15) Mr. Smith knowingly sendsan innocent man to prison for ten long years. What Mr.
Smith did was wrong. Necessarily true or not necessarilytrue?
Answer: [Redacted]. It may be that punishing this innocentman [Redacted].
36. Continued…
Lesson: On HAU, we should punish someone if and only if[Redacted]. This means that,
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on HAU, we should punish the innocent and we should refrain frompunishing the guilty
whenever doing so will maximize hedonic utility. Also, on HAU,the severity of the
punishment should not necessarily be in proportion to theseverity of the crime. The
punishment for a less severe crime should be greater than thepunishment for a more
severe crime if this will maximize hedonic utility.
37. The Practical Objection to HAU
On HAU, it is often times practically impossible to know how youought to act. To know
what you ought to do, you would have to consider every possiblealternative act open to
you, and, for each, you would need to know, all of its effectsfrom now until the end of
time.
Response: HAU is a criterion of rightness ([Redacted]) not adecision procedure
([Redacted]).
Note that HAU is no more impractical than the view that the mostprudent act is the one
that will maximize one’s utility over time. No one would suggestthat we ought to reject
the investment principle “Buy low, and sell high” just becauseit often times practicallyimpossible to know whether the price of astock’s price is headed up or down.
Note that the utilitarian can employ [Redacted].
38. Theoretical Objections to HAU
Punishment: HAU will, in certain circ*mstances, call forpunishing the innocent as well as
call for disproportionate punishment vis-à-vis the severity ofthe crime.
Rights: HAU doesn’t allow for the notion that people have rightsthat protect them from
certain forms of treatment absent their autonomous consent.
Distributive Justice: [Redacted].
39. Continued…
Backward-Looking Reasons: HAU is entirely forward-looking. Thusthe fact that
someone, in the past, made some promise, committed someinjustice, or was the victim
of some injustice is morally irrelevant.
Demandingness: HAU is extremely demanding. There are few moraloptions on HAU.
HAU requires great personal sacrifice even when the resultingoutcome is only marginally
better than it would be had you not sacrificed.
40. Continued…
Supererogation: On HAU, there are no supererogatory acts. An actis supererogatory if
and only if there is more moral reason to perform it than toperform some morallypermissible alternative.
Special Relationships: On HAU, one’s special relationships aremorally irrelevant. HAU
requires acting in a way that’s completely impartial. (However,it doesn’t require that your
motives be impartial.)
41. Responses to these theoretical objections
First Line of Defense: Appeal to [Redacted]. Some proponentsargue that, in most real
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world cases, HAU does not have the wildly counter-intuitiveimplications that it is
purported to have.
42. Continued…
Second Line of Defense: [Redacted]: Some proponents admit thatHAU does have
wildly counter-intuitive implications in at least hypotheticalcases, but they cite variousreasons for questioning our commonsenseintuitions in such cases.
Evolutionary Reasons: Greene’s Work on Our Intuitions inDifferent Trolley
Cases: Personal vs. Impersonal Violations
Anthropological Reasons: Our intuitions have been wildlymistaken in the past:
The Case of Slavery and the Subjugation of Women.
Consistency Reasons: Our intuitions are often inconsistent:Singer on charity and
animal experimentation
Possible Exam Questions concerning Lecture 3
(a) Explain hedonistic act-utilitarianism (HAU). (b) What is thehedonic utility of an action?(c) Fill in the blank: An actmaximizes hedonic utilityif and only if…. (d) Explainthe
motivation for hedonistic act-utilitarianism.
(a) Explain hedonistic act-utilitarianism (HAU). (b) Explainfour of the seven theoretical
objections to HAU that were discussed in class.
(a) Against these theoretical objections, the utilitarian canappeal to remote effects.
Explain how this defense goes. (b) The utilitarian could alsojust bite the bullet and argue
that the fact that HAU has counter-intuitive implications isn’toverly worrisome given that
our intuitions about such matters are suspect. Explain how thisdefense goes.
(a) Explain hedonistic act-utilitarianism (HAU). (b) Criticallyassess the practical objection
to HAU. (c) What sort of decision procedure should hedonisticact-utilitarians adopt? (d)Explain the distinction between acriterion of rightness and a decision procedure.
Answer the following questions according to whathedonistic act utilitarianism (HAU)
entails—answer either “Necessarily True” or “Not NecessarilyTrue.” In each case, explain your
answer and what lesson (or lessons) we should take from it.
An act is morally impermissible if it causes someone a lotof pain and no pleasure.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
An act is morally impermissible if it produces, in theaggregate, more pain than pleasure.
In other words, an act is morally impermissible if it hasnegative hedonic utility.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
If an act produces pleasure for many and pain for no one, thenit is morally permissible.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
It is morally impermissible to listen to Metallicaon thecar’s CD player if the other two
people in the car would get more pleasure from listening to TheBeatles. Assume that
listening to Metallicaand listening to TheBeatlesare the only two available options.
Assume that you and the other two people in the car arethe only ones who will be
affected by this choice. Necessarily true or not necessarilytrue?
In an effort to help his patient, Dr. Smith injects Jones with ashot of penicillin after
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dutifully asking him whether he’s allergic to penicillin andhearing Jones say that he isn’t.
Nevertheless, it turns out, unbeknownst to Jones even, thatJones is severely allergic to
penicillin, and, consequently, he dies as a result of theinjection. Assuming that there
would have been more hedonic utility had Dr. Smith not injectedJones with the shot of
penicillin, it follows that what Dr. Smith did was wrong.Necessarily true or not
necessarily true?Anyone who acts wrongly as Dr. Smith didabove is a morally bad person, deserving of
both blame and punishment. Necessarily true or not necessarilytrue?
It is morally permissible to torture an innocent baby in certaincirc*mstances. Necessarily
true or not necessarily true?
The effects that our actions will have on people’s welfaremillions of years from now are
just as important as their immediate effects. Necessarilytrue or not necessarily true?
While waiting at a crosswalk, Mr. Smith sees a stranger aboutstep off the curb into the
path on an oncoming, speeding bus. Without thinking, Mr. Smithreaches out, grabs the
stranger, and pulls him back onto the curb, saving his life. Mr.Smith does this without
even thinking about what the hedonic utility of this act or anyof its alternatives might be.What Mr. Smith did was wrong.Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
If you promised a kid ten bucks to wash your car and he did aspromised (he washed
your car and did a nice job), you should give him the ten bucks.Necessarily true or not
necessarily true?
Mr. Smith has an extra $500 this month after paying all hisbills. He uses that $500 to buy
his son a set of encyclopedias to help with his son’sschoolwork. But had Smith instead
used that $500 to buy some stranger’s kid a set of encyclopediasthat would have
produced slightly more hedonic utility. What Mr. Smith did waswrong. Necessarily true or
not necessarily true?
In deciding what to eat for breakfast this morning, Mr. Johnsonis morally required tomake the choice that produces the greatesthedonic utility. Assume that, according to
HAU, Mr. Johnson ought to eat something for breakfast thismorning, and that what
choice he makes will affect only himself. Necessarily true ornot necessarily true?
The King of Siam must adopt either policy X or policy Y. Thisdecision will affect only
those people belonging to one of the following two populations:population A and
population B. Population A consists in a hundred poor personswith 10 hedons each.
Population B consists in a hundred affluent persons with 100hedons each. The King of
Siam adopts policy X, which has no effect on the people inpopulation A, but raises the
number of hedons for each person in population B by 90 hedons.Had the King of Siam
adopted policy Y instead, this would have had no effect on thepeople in population B, but
would have raised the number of hedons for each person inpopulation A by 90 hedons.
Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
On HAU, there are no supererogatory acts (i.e., acts that goabove and beyond what duty
requires). Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
Mr. Smith knowingly sends an innocent man to prison for ten longyears. What Mr. Smith
did was wrong. Necessarily true or not necessarily true?
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1. Singer’s Thesis
All animals (human and non-human) are equal, in the samesense that all humans are
equal.
2. The Notion of EqualityWhen we claim that all human beings,whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what
exactly are we asserting?
Are we asserting that all human beings are equal in theirabilities and capacities?
Are we asserting that all races, and both sexes, are equalin their abilities and capacities?
Two reasons why we ought not to base our opposition to racismand sexism on any kind
of actual equality, even the limited kind that asserts thatvariations in capacities and
abilities are spread evenly between the different races and bothsexes:
It may turn out that variations in capacities and abilities arenot spread evenly between
the races and sexes, and some variations turn out to beinnate.
We would, then, have no basis for opposing an inegaltariansociety based on factualdifferences.
4. Factual Equality vs. Prescriptive Equality
“The principle of the equality of human beings is not adescription of an alleged actual
equality among humans; it is a prescription of how we shouldtreat humans.”
5. The Basic Principle of Equality
The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: We ought togive equal consideration to
the interests of all sentient beings—whatever their race, creed,sex, or species—in our
moral deliberations.
6. Interests and Suffering
The capacity for suffering is sufficient for having interests.Any being with the capacity to
suffer has an interest in avoiding suffering.
Most animals (unlike stones, plants etc) have the capacity tosuffer.
Therefore, most animals have an interest in avoidingsuffering.
Equal consideration requires that animal interests in notsuffering be taken equally into
account with human interests in not suffering.
Failure to give equal consideration to both human and animalinterest is speciesm.
7. Racism, Sexism, and Speciesism
What is racism? What is sexism?
Speciesism: A bias towards the interest of the members of one'sown species and
against those of the members of another species.
species : speciesism :: race : racism :: sex : sexism
Note, then, that on Singer’s conceptual framework the view thatone race/sex/species is
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superior to another is a certain respect is notracist/sexist/speciest.
8. Why is racism wrong?
Why is racism wrong? Why is it wrong to let our treatment ofothers be dictated by their
race?
Answer: Because race is not itself, relevant to howothers ought to be treated.
9. Is species membership relevant?
Is species membership morally relevant? What is it to belong tothe species hom*o
sapiens?
Does one have to have the capacity for language?
Does one have to have the capacity for abstract reasoning?
Membership in the species hom*o sapiensseems both toonarrow and too broad to serve
as a legitimate basis for giving direct moral consideration.
Direct versus indirect moral consideration.
Too Narrow: Intelligent aliens.Too Broad: Brain-dead humans.
11. The Argument from Marginal Cases
The Argument from Marginal Cases is meant to show that if wedon’t owe animals direct
moral consideration, then we don’t owe marginal cases ofhumanity direct moral
consideration either. Here’s the argument:
If we are justified in denying direct moral consideration toanimals, then we are justified in
denying direct moral consideration to the marginal cases.
We are not justified in denying direct moral consideration tothe marginal cases.
Therefore, we are not justified denying direct moralconsideration to animals.
12. To avoid being speciesist…
…must we treat all animals the same?
Equal consideration for different beings may lead to differenttreatment where
interest differ, treatment may differ.
“Animals can feel pain…, [and] there can be no moraljustification for regarding the pain
(or pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the sameamount of pain (or
pleasure) felt by humans.”
13. HoweverHowever, we must note that…
The same amount of physical pain can cause more total humansuffering than animal
suffering; humans have extra capacities:
human memory and anticipation
emotional ties between humans
social communication and stability
But this may not apply to orphan human infants.
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We also must note that an animal’s lack of ability to understandmay lead to its greater
suffering.
14. To avoid being speciesist…
…must we extend the same rights to all animals?
Equal consideration for different beings may lead to differentrights e.g. asserting thatdogs have a right to vote is just asasserting that men have a right to an abortion.
15. To avoid being speciesist…
…must we value the lives of all animals equally?
We may admit that some features of certain beings (e.g.,self-awareness, the ability to
understand abstract concepts, the ability to act for a reason,etc.) make their lives
more valuable than the lives of other beings who do not havethese features; but
there will surely be some nonhuman animals whose lives, by anysuch standards, are
more valuable than the lives of some humans.
16. Continued…
The question is should we treat severely disabled humans as wenow treat nonhuman
animals with equivalent abilities and capacities, or should wetreat these nonhuman
animals with the same care that we currently extend to even themost severely disabled
humans. Or perhaps we should adopt some middle position.
17. Why the belief that human life, and only human life, issacrosanct is speciesist?
To hold that the boundary of the right to life runs exactlyparallel to the boundary of our
own species is irredeemably speciesist. “Those who hold thesanctity of [human] life do
this because while distinguishing sharply between humans andother animals they allowno distinctions to be made within our ownspecies, objecting to the killing of the severely
retarded and the hopelessly senile as strongly as they object tothe killing of normal
adults.
18. The test for speciesism:
If we are willing to do X to certain nonhuman animals butunwilling to do X on humans
who arein all morally relevant respects inferior to thesenonhuman animals,then
we are acting speciesist in doing X to those nonhumananimals.
19. Speciesism in Practice:Factory Farming
Defenses?
Animal Testing and Experimentation
Defenses?
20. A Potential Problem with Singer’s Account ofSexism/Racism/Speciesism
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Is it sexist for a woman to donate her money to breast cancerresearch as opposed to
prostate cancer research even if the principle of equalconsideration of interests supports
the latter?
Is it racist for an African American to set up a scholarship fordisadvantaged African
Americans as opposed to setting up a scholarship fordisadvantaged Native Americans
even if the principle of equal consideration of interestssupports the latter?The importance of special relationships…
21. Continued…
Do we have a special relationship with other members of ourspecies in the way that,
say, women have a special relationship with other members oftheir sex?
How does this problem bear on Singer’s arguments againstpractices such as animal
testing and factory farming?
22. The argument from fairness, an argument againstspeciesism
Fairness demands that beings that are alike in all morallyrelevant respects be treatedalike.
Fairness demands that brings that are alike in all morallyrelevant respects
be treated alike.
Speciesism/racism/sexism involves treating different beingsdifferently
simply because they belong to a different species/race/sex.
What species/race/sex a being belongs to is not, in itself,morally relevant.
Therefore, speciesism is unfair.
What species/race/sex a being belongs to is not, in itself,morally relevant.
Therefore, speciesism is unfair.Objections?
The Problem: Absolute Poverty
Nearly one-fifth of the world’s population lives in absolutepoverty. Absolute poverty is
poverty by any standard, which is to be distinguished from therelative poverty that we are
familiar with in industrialized nations. Robert McNamara, pastpresident of the World
Bank, describes absolute poverty as follows: “A condition oflife so characterized by
malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, highinfant mortality rate and low lifeexpectancy as to be beneath anyreasonable definition of human decency.”
2. Continued…
Those living in absolute poverty have:
An infant mortality rate that is eight times higher thanthat in most industrialized nations.
A life expectancy that is one-third lower that that inmost industrialized nations.
A nutritional level, for one of every two in thepopulation, below acceptable standards.
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Little to no access to even basic health care.
Little to no access to safe drinking water.
-- The above information is from Peter Singer, Practical Ethics,2nd Edition (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
3. Some widely available facts about some easily preventabledeathsEach year millions of children die from easily preventablecauses. Each year around
three million children die from dehydrating diarrhea. Most ofthese deaths can be
prevented by administrating oral rehydration salts at a cost ofaround 15 cents a packet.
Also millions of children die from immunizable diseases.Each year over a million die
from measles alone, and it only costs $17 to vaccinate a childagainst measles.
Pneumonia claims 3.5 million children each year, making it theleading childhood killer.
However, most of these deaths can be prevented with a simpleshot of antibiotics costing
about 25 cents. Many malnourished children have a deficiency invitamin A, causing their
immune systems to be greatly debilitated. Many of these childrencan be saved with a
semiannual dose of vitamin A costing only 10 cents.
4. Some misconceptions about the problem
Reducing the infant mortality rate in the Third World wouldcause a population explosion.
The best available evidence supports the claim that decreasinginfant mortality rate
actually lowers the rate of population growth. Consider thepoverty-ridden Indian state of
Kerala. In this state, the infant mortality rate issignificantly lower than average. Yet it has
a low Total Fertility Rate, 1.9, meaning that the populationsize is actually in decline.
Reducing the infant mortality rate would be pointless becausethere is little chance that
even those children that make it through infancy will live oninto adulthood.Those children that make it through the first fiveyears of life have a 90 percent chance of
living beyond the age of 21.
5. Continued…
Poverty is inseparably linked with high infant mortality and lowlife expectancy.
Consider again the Indian state of Kerala, one of India'spoorest states. Because
Keralans have an adequate supply of food, safe drinking water,and basic health care,
they have the highest life expectancy of any state in India anda lower than average infant
mortality rate.
There is not enough food to meet the nutritional needs ofeveryone in the world.There is more than enough food to feed theworld's population. Most of the grain
produced in industrialized nations is fed to farm animals,converting it into meat, milk, and
eggs. Because this is a very inefficient process, wasting up to95% of the nutritional value
of the animal feed, people in countries such as the U.S. consumemore than three times
as much grain per capita than those countries that consume lessanimal products.
-- The above information comes from Peter Unger’s Living Highand Letting Die: Our
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Illusion of Innocence(New York: Oxford University Press,1996).
6. Focusing on the Philosophical Issue
For our purposes, we will not be concerned with whether or notUnger and Singer have
their facts right. We will instead be interested in thefollowing philosophical question: If
these facts are correct, does it follow that we have an ethicalobligation to do somethingto alleviate absolute poverty and, if so,what exactly?
And, for the sake of argument, let’s assume that there aresome easily identifiable
organizations (such as, Oxfam and UNICEF) such that thefollowing is true: were you to
give a substantial portion of your income to thoseorganizations, the good that that
organization would do with your money would far exceed the goodthat would come from
your spending that money luxuries for yourself and for yourloved ones. More specifically,
let’s assume that for each $200 donation that you make somechild who would otherwise
die in infancy will instead live a reasonably long life that iswell worth living.
7. Singer’s ArgumentIf [it is in our power to prevent somethingbad from happening, without thereby
sacrificing anything of moral significance, we ought, morally,to do it.], we ought,
morally, to do it.
Absolute poverty (i.e., suffering and death from lack offood, shelter, and medical care) is
bad.
There is some absolute poverty that we can prevent withoutsacrificing anything of
(comparable) moral significance.
Therefore, we (morally) ought to prevent some absolutepoverty.
8. Critically Assessing the ArgumentIs the argument valid?
Yes.
The argument is valid because there is no possible way for theconclusion
to be false while the premises are true.
Which, if any, premises are controversial?
Premise 2 is incontrovertible.
Premise 3 is controversial, but we're going to accept it for thesake of the
argumentsince we’re interested in the philosophical issueof whether assuming
that Premise 3 is true we’re obligated to do something toprevent absolute
poverty.This leaves us with Premise 1.
9. Premise 1: Singer’s Principle
By “without sacrificing anything of (comparable) moralsignificance,” Singer means
without causing anything else (comparably) morally bad tohappen, or doing something
that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good(comparable in significance
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to the bad thing we can prevent).
Does giving up luxuries count as sacrificing anything of moralsignificance let alone as
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance?
By eliminating both the parentheses and the words enclosed bythem, we obtain the
moderate principle. By eliminating the parentheses and keepingthe words they
enclosed, we obtain the strong principle.
10. Getting Clear on What the Principle Says
Is either version of Singer’s principle equivalent to theact-utilitarianism (a.k.a. the
principle of utility)?
Answer: No.
Neither principle requires that we do anything in a world inwhich nothing
bad is going to happen. Act-utilitarianism requires us not onlyto prevent
what is bad but also to promote what is good.
What does he mean by “morally ought to give aid”? Does he meanthat it would be
supererogatory to do so or that it would be wrong not to doso?Answer: He means that you're morally obligated to give andthus it would
be wrong not to do so.
What does Singer say in support of his principle?
Answer: He gives the example of the shallow pond and ourintuition of we
are morally obligated to save the child.
11. Two Implications of His Principle
It makes no difference whether the person I can help is aneighbor’s child ten yards away
from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousandmiles away.
The situation where there are millions of other people who areequally able to provide aidbut are not doing so is notsignificantly different, morally speaking, from the situation
where I am the only person who can provide aid.
12. With regard to the first implication
Proximity may make it more likely, for obvious psychologicalreasons, that I shall assist
him, but it is not obvious that proximity makes any differenceconcerning whether I ought
to assist him.
Distance can matter indirectly, as where proximity puts me in abetter position to judge
what a person needs are. But is it at all unclear what theBengali’s refugee’s needs are?
Distance can also matter indirectly, as where proximity puts mein a better position toeffect a positive outcome. But famine relieforganizations have people in the field who
can direct our aid to distant strangers in need just aseffectively as we could someone on
our own block. In fact, they might even be more effective.
13. With regard to the second implication
Consider the case where I see other people around the shallowpond, no further away
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than I am, who have also noticed the drowning child but aredoing nothing.
Is my obligation to save the child diminished?
But suppose that if everyone was to give $10 to the BengalRelief Fund, there would be
enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for all therefugees. Why should I be
required to give more than $10?
Here’s the argument:If everyone in circ*mstances like mine wereto give $10, I would have no obligation to give
more than $10. Therefore, I am not obligated to give more than$10. This is invalid.
What premise would we need to add to make the argumentvalid?
Is that premise true?
People in the same circ*mstances have the same obligation, butthe fact that others
have given or not given, or are expected or not expected togive, are relevant
circ*mstances.
14. Objections
Does his principle (the moderate version) imply that we shouldtake care of those inabsolute poverty before taking car
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